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CASE COMMENTS
Attorneys--The Fifth Amendment and Disbarment Proceedings
Petitioner, P, a member of the New York State Bar was disbarred
for professional misconduct. P's misconduct was based on a failing
to honor a subpoena by refusing to testify and refusing to produce
certain demanded financial records at a judicial investigation. P's
sole defense to the disbarment was that he declined to honor the
subpoena because his testimony and the production of the records
would tend to incriminate him. The New York courts, relying on
Cohen v. Hurley,' held that the privilege against self-incrimination
was not available to the petitioner. Held, reversed. The self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment as absorbed in the fourteenth
amendment extends its protection to lawyers and should not be
watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and deprivation of livelihood as a price for asserting it. Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511 (1967).
The question of how much protection a lawyer has in claiming
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a disbarment proceeding is a problem the courts have often tried to solve.2
The problem seemed to have been resolved by the 1961 Supreme
Court decision of Cohen v. Hurley.3

Cohen, having a factual situation analogous to the principal case,
permitted the New York State court to construe the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination so as to make it unavailable in
judicial inquiries involving lawyer misconduct.' By allowing the
question to be resolved according to state law, the Cohen case necessarily held that the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment
was not made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
The Court in Cohen felt that in dealing with lawyers there should be
some way to get to the truth in order to protect society from having
questionable persons practicing law, and that lawyers have a duty
of cooperation with the court.
'366 U.S. 117 (1961).
The Fifth Amendment and the Lawyer's Responsibility, 34
NIEB. L. REv. 586 (1955).
3366 U.S. 117 (1961).
4 The case of Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), had set the
stage for decisions like Cohen by declaring that exemption from compulsory
self-incrimination in the state courts is not secured by any part of the Federal
Constitution.
2 Weigel,
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The four dissenting judges in Cohen5 argued that the theory of
the majority would depend on weighing the rights of the states in
disbarment proceedings against the rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. The dissent also rejected the theory that practice of law
is nothing more than a state conferred privilege which can be
destroyed by the state whenever it is able to assert a reasonable
ground for doing so. The dissent contended this would permit plain
confiscation and taking away of rights without due process of law.
The Cohen case stood as unchallenged precedent until partially
eroded in the 1964 decision of Malloy v. Hogan.6 Malloy, while not
completely overruling Cohen, held that the fourteenth amendment
guaranteed the protection of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination from abridgment by the state. The decision states,
"[T]he fourteenth amendment secures against state invasion .. .the
right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . .
for such silence." ' Interpreting this holding, the Court in Griffin
v. California,' held that the fifth amendment protection is not limited
to cases in which the penalty would be a fine or imprisonment but
rather there is a penalty if the asertion of the privilege would be
costly.

The majority in the principal case was consistent with past
decisions in according liberal construction to the fifth amendment
privilege. 9 By reasoning that this threat of disbarment and loss of
livelihood was within the broadened scope of the term penalty the
Court did nothing more than make a logical extension of its expressions in the Malloy and Griffin holdings and the Cohen dissent.
The Court in the principal case, while answering the question of
compelled testimony, seemingly allowed the question of compelled
production of required records to go unanswered when it refused to
overrule Sharpiro v. United States.'" Sharpiro which dealt with
federal price control regulation, held that compelled production of
required records did not violate the fifth amendment. The required
records were said to be records with public aspects as distinguished
- The majority in the principal case adopted the view of the dissent in
Cohen saying, "These views, expounded in the dissents in Cohen v. Hurley,
need not be elaborated again." 87 S. Ct. 625, 627 (1967).
6378
U.S. 1 (1964).
7
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
8 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
9See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
10335 U.S. 1 (1948).
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from private papers. Therefore, it appears with Sharpiroas precedent,
that the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination has not
been extended far enough to provide a sanctuary to the attorney
refusing to produce required records."
West Virginia has, by statutes and rules, provided procedures to
be followed in disbarment proceedings."2 However, the statutes and
rules make no mention of any inferences or consequences that can
result from the refusal of the accused to answer questions. Furthermore, research has failed to disclose any West Virginia case dealing
with the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a
disbarment proceeding. The court did, however, in In re Damron"
state that the misconduct which justifies the suspension or the
annulment of a license to practice law must be established by full,
clear and preponderant evidence. The court in West Virginia State
Bar v. Earley"4 called the right to practice law a valuable privilege.
These cases seem to imply that West Virginia courts treat the right
to practice law as a franchise worthy of protection which should not
be deprived without due process of law. Thus, the extension of this
fifth amendment right to state disbarment proceedings is not a rapid
departure from past West Virginia procedure but rather would appear
merely to be one step further in guaranteeing due process of law.
The full effect of the Spevack case is yet to come. However, it is
apparent that it stands as a logical extension of the trend of recent
Supreme Court decisions to insure greater protection to basic
individual rights.' 5 By such an extension of the protection of rights
of attorneys, various bar associations may be somewhat hampered
in their attempts to discipline the members of their respective bars.
The Court has apparently decided that this social cost is outweighed
by consideration of the individual rights of attorneys.
PatrickDavid Deem
"The majority in the principal case felt they did not have to overrule
Sharpiro because all of the proceedings up to the New York Court of Appeals
had proceeded on the theory that Spevack could claim the privilege as to the
records but his consequence may be disbarment. However when the case
reached the New York Court of Appeals, he was challenged as to his right
to claim the privilege. The court relying on Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196
(1948), felt this was denying the petitioner procedural rights to challenge
the reasons
for his disbarment and therefore refused to consider Sharpiro.
2
S W. VA. CoDE ch. 30, art. 2, § 7 (Michie 1966); W. VA. STATE BAR
BY-LAws, art. VI.

131 W. Va. 66, 45 S.E.2d 741 (1947).
144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959).
15 E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'3

'
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Constitutional Law-Civil RightsState Action Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Ds, the Governor of Ohio and other officials, proposed to enter
into construction contracts for a public educational facility. Ps, two
Negroes who had made repeated unsuccessful attempts to gain
membership in certain labor unions, brought a class action for
declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin Ds, alleging that qualified
Negroes would be unable to get jobs because the contractors would
use only union hiring sources and some union officials prevented
Negroes from obtaining union membership. Held, injunction granted.
Ds' proposed action would be a deprivation of Ps' privileges and
immunities under color of state law. The state is not allowed to
avoid responsibilities under the fourteenth amendment by ignoring
or failing to perform them. Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83
(S.D. Ohio 1967).
The pivotal issue in the principal case was whether Ds' conduct
amounted to state action within the prohibitions of the fourteenth
amendment.' Federal courts have long held that the fourteenth
amendment applies only to state action and not to individual action.'
In the Ethridge case individual actions (union discrimination practices) were primarily responsible for the harm complained of by
plaintiffs. The court logically held, however, that the state's dealings
with the union (through the construction firms) amounted to participation in the discrimination. This in itself was enough to
constitute "state action." 3
One of the first cases to define "state action" was Ex parte
Virginia.4 In this case the Supreme Court sustained an indictment
against a state officer for excluding Negroes from a jury list. Holding
that the action by the state officer was state action, the Court said:'
U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1. The applicable part of this section reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
'Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); Barbier
v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883);
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963); But see United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966). For a comment on the state action concept in the area of
individual actions, see 66 W. Va. L. Rev. 325 (1964).
3 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 87 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
4 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
1

sId. at 347.
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Whoever, by virtue of public position under a State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due
process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of
the laws, violates the Constitutional inhibition; and as he acts
in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's
power, his act is that of the State.
Two other cases previous to Ex parte Virginia revolved around
the same central theme. The Supreme Court struck down a West
Virginia statute which denied Negroes the right to serve as jurors in
Strauderv. West Virginia.' In Virginia v. Rives' the question of state
action was raised where a judge overruled a motion to modify an all
white jury to include one third Negroes in a murder trial of two
Negroes.'
The principle established by these and other decisions is that the
fourteenth amendment governs all action of a state whether through
its executive or administrative officers, legislature, or courts." The
question of state action has arisen over the years in a number of
cases,"0 the Court applying the above principle to the facts of each
case." It must be remembered, however, that not all the acts of state
officers are acts of the state. They must act under state authority
or "color of state authority,"' 2 or under "color or pretense '"3 of law
4
before such acts constitute state action.
6100 U.S. 303 (1879).
7100
U.S. 313 (1879).
8 Id. The Court defined state action, but determined
that there was
none here.
9 Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S.
442 (1900); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
"See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (court permitting
damage judgments for breach of racially restrictive covenants); Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (court enforcing racially restrictive covenants);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (same); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938) (city manager requiring license to distribute literature);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (prosecuting attorney contriving
to procure conviction and imprisonment of individual); Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927) (statute prohibiting Negro participation in primary
elections); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278
(1913) (city ordinance establishing telephone rates).
" For discussions of the historical development of the state action
concept, see Barnett, What Is "State" Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth,
and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?, 24 ORE. L. REv. 227

(1945);Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition

14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60
CoLm. L. REv. 1083 (1960); Van Astyne and Karst, State Action, 14
STANFORD L. REv. 3 (1961).
12 Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 246 (1931).
'3 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
'4 "Color" would include those acts which are done under a semblance
of
authority, as opposed to those done under actual authority. BLAcK's LAw
DicTioNARY 331 (4th ed. 1951).
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A plaintiff injured as a result of state action may obtain relief
through federal statutes such as those relied on in the principal
case.'5 The court held that the plaintiffs correctly asserted jurisdiction
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964),6 which had been defined and
applied previously in the landmark decision of Monroe v. Pape.7
Under this section any public officer who violates the constitutional
rights of a citizen may have an action or suit brought against him.
Plaintiffs in Ethridge case, having established state action on the part
of the defendants, were enabled to seek and obtain injunctive relief.
Even though plaintiffs had established jurisdiction in the federal
courts, the more important issue arose as to whether intervention
by the federal court was premature. Federal'" and state 9 statutes
distinctly spell out the procedure under which plaintiffs would have
obtained redress in this situation, i.e., racial discrimination. Under
the federal statute monetary damages arising out of discriminatory
work practices equal to the amount of back pay dating to the time
of discrimination may be awarded. Plaintiffs were obligated to prove
that the injury to them warranted the extraordinary relief of an
injunction by a federal district court rather than just monetary
damages." The court here reasoned that injunctive relief was
warranted since such discrimination tends to have an adverse psychological effect on the class discriminated against which cannot be
remedied by the payment of money." This identical argument was
made by the Supreme Court in the now famous decision of Brown
v. Board of Education.2
1'28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (3), 2201 (1964); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983
(1964).
1642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. (Emphasis added.)
17 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
See also Sigue v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp.,
235 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. La. 1964); Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 153
F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Oppenheimer v. Stillwell, 132 F. Supp.
761 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
1842 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964).
, 9 0ro REV. CODE, ch. 4112 (1964). For the applicable West Virginia
statute
20 see W. VA. CODE ch. 5, art. 11, §§ 1-15 (Michie Supp. 1967).
Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1967); accord,
Local 499, IBEW v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 224 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Iowa
1964).
21 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83,88 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
22 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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At this point it is important to note that the same statute which
would award back pay also admits the complaining party into the
union which is guilty of discrimination thereby giving him complete
relief. Plaintiffs in the principal case could have obtained relief
through the state and federal administrative procedure. Federal
courts have long held that they cannot interfere in such matters until
all administrative procedures are exhausted.2 3 Although this rule
has been modified to some extent,2" general speaking it is still the
law."5 However, it must be remembered that the principal case
involves a class action instead of an individual action, and the rule
would not necessarily be binding by analogy. Furthermore, the relief
sought must be considered. Plaintiffs were seeking to enjoin defendants from participating with discriminatory unions and in no
way asked for back pay or admission to a union. The above issues
will be important if the decision is appealed, for it is upon these
issues that the plaintiffs' right to federal court relief rests.
In the principal case Negroes as a class were successful in attacking
union discrimination indirectly through state officers dealing with
the union. The decision has a twofold effect: (1) It forces the state
of Ohio to take notice of racial discrimination in labor unions, and
(2) it forces the labor unions to reconsider past decisions concerning
the continued practice of such discrimination. This case does
raise the problem of federal intervention in state affairs: it limits
those parties with which a state may contract, perhaps an undue
restriction on the freedom of parties to contract with whomever they
choose. However, the court balanced this freedom of contract
against the rights of individuals as guaranteed by the Constitution
and again upheld those rights. This decision may well be followed
in the future as it represents a speedy and effective means by which
Negroes and other groups as a class may secure recognition of their
civil rights. It also represents one of the largest extensions of the
state action concept since its inception. When any action interferes
23 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Hegeman
Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163 (1934); United States v. Illinois
Central R.R. 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521
(1932); Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959); Holt v. Raleigh
City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1959); Carson v. Warlick, 238
F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956); Carson v. Bd. of Educ., 227 F.2d 789 (4th Cir.

1955).

Perez v. Rhiddlehoover, 247 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. La. 1965).
For a discussion on the problem of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATrVE LAw §§ 20.01-20.10 (1959).
24

25
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with the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, and especially
action in some manner sanctioned or authorized by a state, other
extensions may arguably be warranted.
John CharlesLobert

Damages-Vehicle-Recovery of More Than Actual Physical
Damage When the Vehicle is Partially Destroyed
D negligently damaged the taxicab of P. The cost to repair the
taxicab was $1,349 while the difference in market value before
and after the collision was $415. P claims that under the special
circumstances of a city ordinance he is not permitted to buy a used
car and convert it to a taxicab. P, therefore, contends he must have
the cost of repair to make him whole. The lower court held he was
entitled only to the difference in fair market values. Held, affirmed.
The general rule for damages to personal property partially destroyed
is that the difference in fair market values before and after the
accident is the proper element of recovery where such is less than the
cost of repair. Here P failed to show the necessary special circumstances which would have made this general rule inapplicable, i.e., P
failed to show that he could not buy a used taxicab which would
satisfy the city ordinance. In the absence of such a showing he was
completely compensated by recovering the difference in fair market
values. Norview Cars Incorporated v. Crews, 156 S.E.2d 603 (Va.
1967).
The rule of damages in the principal case is a widely accepted one
used in many jurisdictions.' It focuses on the actual physical damage
inflicted. However, it is but one of several elements of recovery
available to the injured party who might also be able to obtain
recovery for loss of use or rental value, loss of profits, removal and
storage, and interest.
The puropse of compensatory damages is to compensate the person
wholly for the losses sustained concurrent with the least burden to
the wrongdoer. In cases of personal property where there has been
total destruction, this objective is achieved by awarding the fair
market value, at the time of the accident, of the item destroyed less
any salvage value. Where there has been partial destruction, the
'22 Am.

JuR.

2d Damages § 145 (1965).
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